De Feo Giuseppe Dr

Biographical Information

Giuseppe De Feo obtained his PhD in January 2008 and his MA in 2004 from the Université catholique de Louvain. He received the BA in Economics and his first PhD from the Università di Napoli 'Federico II'.

Giuseppe's interests are in the fields of Applied Microeconomic Theory, Industrial Organization and Public Economics. There are three basic, interrelated themes in his research activity: the functioning of markets with strategic interaction among firms, the effect of imperfect information on the efficiency of competitive markets, and the scope for public intervention in the presence of market imperfections. In particular, the analysis of markets under asymmetric information, merger and antitrust issues, oligopoly theory, and policy competition for foreign direct investments (FDI) are the main topics of his papers.

In the job market paper, the effect of asymmetric information on insurance markets is analyzed. It is show that adverse selection is in general worse under competition than under monopoly. The reason is that monopoly can exploit its market power to relax incentive constraints by cross-subsidization between different risk types. An empirical validation of these results is encompassed in his future research agenda, along with the application of the same methodology to financial and credit markets and to models of moral hazard.

The work on policy competition for FDI continues with Oscar Amerighi of Bologna University. His interest in asymmetric information is now devoted to the analysis of the workplace injury liability insurance market and to the effects of distance on financial markets.