Police Promises to Protect: Chief Constable v Woodcock

By Douglas Brodie - posted on 21 February 2025

The law of negligence is anxious not to impose too great a burden on the police. As a result, it has been held that the police do not owe a duty of care to individuals to protect them against harm to their person or property caused by the criminal actions of a third party.

This protective stance can be traced back to the decision of the House of Lords in Hill v Chief Constable [1998] AC 53 where an unsuccessful action was brought by a mother whose daughter had been murdered by a serial killer. That being said, the law does allow for exceptions, such as where there has been an assumption of responsibility by the police, or where the police have made matters worse. The recent decision of the Court of Appeal in Chief Constable v Woodcock [2025] EWCA Civ 13 (Woodcock) raises the question of when advice or assurances given will form the basis for an assumption of responsibility.

Woodcock: an ineffectual safety plan

In Woodcock, the Claimant was leaving her home and getting into her car when she was viciously attacked by her former partner Riza Guzelyurt (RG). The claimant had been in an abusive and coercive relationship with RG.

Prior to the attack a safety plan had been constructed by the police which provided that the Claimant should do the following:

keep her mobile phone fully charged at all times; if RG attended her home to get into a locked room and call the police; to lock all windows and doors; to have family and friends stay over for the night; to call the police on 999 if she saw RG; to make neighbours aware of the issue.

When the matter reached the High Court ([2023] EWHC 1062), it was found that the police had assumed a responsibility by giving advice. In particular, the police had come under a responsibility, “to warn the Claimant if a neighbour provided the [police] with information that RG was lurking outside her house that morning just as she was due to leave to go to work” (at paragraph [113]).

The police appealed against this ruling. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and found for the Chief Constable. No assumption of responsibility was said to have arisen (at paragraph [122]):

They had not promised Ms Woodcock that they would warn her of any sighting of [RG] near her home, and had not promised to pass on to her any information they received alerting them to a danger. They had not promised to respond within any particular time to any information alerting them to a risk of attack.

Assumption of responsibility: a flawed exception? 

The decision of the Court of Appeal strikes me as correct. The police had simply given advice as to what the Claimant should do to help protect herself from the threat posed by her former partner. It is difficult to see what distinguishes the situation from countless everyday occurrences where advice or assurances are given to concerned members of the public. It is also worth noting that the police will issue “Osman” warnings in very serious situations, such as where there is a specific threat to life.

The Court in Woodcock at paragraph [121] stressed that for an assumption of responsibility to arise, “it will usually be necessary for the claimant to show something in the way of a specific representation or promise by the police to take particular action.” When the nature of the interaction between the parties is scrutinised in Woodcock, I think that it difficult to maintain that it was specific enough, with regard to considerations of safety, to give rise to an assumption of responsibility.

More fundamentally, I think the very notion that an assumption of responsibility (based upon what was said or otherwise communicated) can constitute an exception to the general position on police liability is problematic. Determining whether a duty arises on the basis of assurances or advice offered would be highly fact sensitive and the inherent vagaries involved would be likely to lead to a considerable amount of litigation. There would be a risk that broadly similar situations would be treated differently on the basis of narrow distinctions. There might also be a danger of favouring the persistent (or better informed) member of the public who managed to extract information or advice from a police officer. The focus though should be on ensuring that all those facing similar predicaments receive an equal measure of protection.

What though if stronger and more concrete assurances are given by the police in a scenario akin to Woodcock? In the High Court, Ritchie J had suggested (at paragraph [32]) the following hypothetical situation:

…if the police have represented to the victim that they will keep her safe and if the victim has relied on that promise and acted to her detriment (for instance by sending away her own private security guards) then the police have assumed a duty of care… this set of facts (unlikely though they may be) may well fulfil the exception called assumption of responsibility...

How strong is the foregoing case? What if, as a consequence of the security guards being sent away, an assault occurred? In such a scenario it might seem harsh if the victim was not in a position to recover in damages against the police. What though should be the basis of the claim?

I would suggest that it should be on the ground of making matters worse or creating a new risk. I think that provides a much clearer basis of liability.

Conclusions

The concept of assumption of responsibility is hugely problematic in cases where a public body is the defender. It remains unclear what will be required to demonstrate that a duty is owed on this basis. It is certainly the case that there will be a focus on the interaction between the parties, but it must be emphasised that it is a routine part of policing to give advice or support. It is then very difficult to say what takes a case out of the ordinary and should lead to the imposition of a duty. Determining liability on the basis of whether the defender has made matters worse offers a much more effective demarcation line.  

Cases involving police informers may be something of a special category. There is clear public interest in encouraging people to come forward and provide information in the public interest. They are unlikely to be willing to do so if they do not feel safe. In An Informer v A Chief Constable [2012] EWCA Civ 197 at paragraph [82] a duty of care arose as “to protect the claimant from risks to physical safety and wellbeing to which he had been potentially exposed as a result of his activities as a covert human intelligence source in providing information about others.” This makes good sense. It is also consistent with the Court of Appeal decision in Woodcock; the basis for an assumption of responsibility arising is entirely different.