EU Court of Justice's Advocate General cites Professor Guido Noto La Diega's research on data as digital assets

The EU Court of Justice's Advocate General has cited Professor Guido Noto La Diega (Strathclyde Law School and Co-lead of the Socially Progressive AI Lab) in an important ruling set to change how direct marketing is governed in Europe.

Under the EU ePrivacy Directive, organisations generally require prior consent to send direct marketing emails to consumers. An exception (“soft opt‑in”) applies where the organisation collected a subscriber’s contact details during the sale of a product or service, the marketing relates to its own similar products or services, the subscriber was given the opportunity to object to such marketing, and each message includes an unsubscribe option.

Until recently, it was uncertain whether arrangements involving “free” access, such as limited free trials, could fall within this exception. In a significant ruling, the EU Court of Justice clarified that they can (Case C-654/23 Inteligo Media SA v Autoritatea Naţională de Supraveghere a Prelucrării Datelor cu Caracter Personal (ANSPDCP), 13 November 2025). 

The Court of Justice's Advocate General cited Guido Noto La Diega, ‘Data as Digital Assets. The Case of Targeted Advertising’, in Mor Bakhoum, Beatriz Conde Gallego, Mark-Oliver Mackenrodt, and Gintarė Surblytė-Namavičienė, Personal data in competition, consumer protection and intellectual property law: Towards a holistic approach? (Springer 2018) 445, calling Noto La Diega's research a “nuanced discussion on the transformation of data into digital assets in the modern digital age” [fn 17].

The Advocate General referred to this publication to make the point that “data themselves are treated as a commodity. Thus, it could be envisaged that for data to have been collected ‘in the context of a sale’ [Article 13(2) eCommerce Directive], it is sufficient that, in lieu of financial consideration, a user furnishes their personal data in exchange for a good or service of value to them” [45]. The Court of Justice sided with the Advocate General and concluded that the term “sale” does not necessarily require direct remuneration for a good or a service.