Our research analyses the behaviour of consumers and firms in markets and the influence of public policies. We apply these ideas to areas such as industrial organisation, international trade and public economics issues.
Aims & objectives
A core aim of our research is to better understand the interaction between firms, consumers and governments in different strategic environments and, consequently, to understand the implications for economic policy. The context of our investigations mainly focus on the areas of international trade, industrial organisation and public economics, and our analytical approach uses modelling techniques that utilise the tools of game theory. Our research has been published in leading international journals, including:
- Journal of International Economics
- Games and Economic Behaviour
- European Economic Review
- Journal of Economic Behaviour & Organisation
- Economic Theory
- International Journal of Game Theory
Our areas of research
International trade theory & policy
Ian Wooton is an established authority in international economics and undertakes research in the area of international trade. The current focus of his research is directed towards investigating the location decisions of firms and subsequent shape of international markets when firms are seeking to undertake foreign direct investment, and potential host countries are competing for this investment.
- Haufler, A and Wooton, I (2010) Competition for firms in an oligopolistic industry: the impact of economic integration. Journal of International Economics, 80 (2). pp. 239-248
- Ferrett, B and Wooton, I (2010) Competing for a duopoly: international trade and tax competition. Canadian Journal of Economics, 43 (3). pp. 776-794
Giuseppe De Feo undertakes research that studies “mixed oligopolies”, that model competition between private sector firms and public sector bodies, with the aim of understanding the nature of outcomes in such markets in relation to competition only between private firms. He's also interested in the efficiency of competition in markets with asymmetric information in particular when considering market power within insurance markets.
- Amir, Rabah and Giuseppe De Feo (2014), “Endogenous Timing in a Mixed Duopoly,” International Journal of Game Theory, vol. 43 (5), p. 629-658
- Giuseppe De Feo and Jean Hindriks (2014), “Harmful competition in insurance markets, ” Journal of Economic Behaviour & Organization, Vol 106, p.213-226
Strategic behaviour in markets
Alex Dickson studies models of “bilateral oligopoly”, which are markets in which both sellers and buyers have market power. His research seeks to understand the nature of outcomes in such markets in order to consider the consequences of market power on both sides of the market. These ideas have been applied in considering a model of trade in the market for pollution permits. Giuseppe De Feo also has interests in strategic behaviour in emission permits trading, having considered the effect of market power in the production market on the efficiency of trade in the pollution permit market.
- Dickson, Alex and Hartley, Roger (2008) The strategic Marshallian cross. Games and Economic Behaviour, 64 (2). pp. 514-532
- Dickson, Alex and Hartley, Roger (2013) Bilateral oligopoly and quantity competition. Economic Theory, 52 (3). pp. 979-1004
- Giuseppe De Feo, Joana Resende and Maria Eugenia Sanin (2013), “Emission permits trading and downstream strategic interaction,” The Manchester School, vol 81 (5), p.780-802